I was recently flattered to be asked how I envisaged the dreaded ‘helicopter money’ working if it were not to simply add further to commercial banks’ already crippling mass of deadweight liabilities and assets, given that not only would printing it up in physical form be tortuous but that cash itself is only one conveniently heinous crime away from being proscribed altogether. Continue reading
Regular readers will know that the articles published here are but a small subset of the detailed work I undertake to analyse economic and political developments and their effects on markets. In order to give some idea of the scope of this, presented below is an archive of past issues of the Austrian School-informed, in-depth monthly publication, ‘Money, Macro & Markets’ in addition to which I compile twice monthly updates as the ‘Midweek Macro Musings’ which are also made available on a complimentary basis to subscribers to the former letter.
In the midst of all the recent uproar, one anonymous Twitterer seized his chance to have his Uber-Warholian, 140-characters-of-fame moment and thundered: ‘Central banks are losing control of this market!’ no doubt eliciting whatever the social media equivalent of a cry of ‘Hear! Hear!’ and an approbatory nodding of the head might be from among his followers. Continue reading
Please read on for a little light Christmas cheer, with apologies to the spirit of Henry Wadsworth Longfellow.
Amid all the debate about the US economy and the somewhat vague prospect of the Fed finally showing some cojones at some point in the future, the principle feature which allows the Doves to block any renormalization of the rate is the supposedly soft state of the labour market, particularly with reference to the sorry-looking participation rate.
In a widely reported speech given in Kochi, BOJ board member Takehiro Sato gave voice to some of the dissent which has riven policy makers – and, we suspect, much of Japanese society – over the issue of whether the government’s latest resort to the Patent Inflationary Panacea (henceforth, the ‘PIP’) is likely to have the desired effect.
Expressing doubts over whether a hard ‘target’ for the attainment of a steady rate of price escalation of 2% a year – that latter-day shibboleth of collectivist Macromancy – Sato made the very reasonable, if little shared, individualist observation that ‘prices reflect the temperature of the economy, not a variable [sic] that can be directly controlled by a central bank.’