


# Money, Macro & Markets

Wednesday, October 18th

Sean Corrigan



## Risk Parity or Risk Party?




Implied *real* yields are also still unconscionably low and furthermore are becoming ever narrower in range – often a sign of turbulence ahead



All part of the general story of a falling sense of both macro and market risk.



US Treasuries 2y v 10y, Divergence from 1981-2017 Mean: *Source - FRED*




The extra return to be had for accepting maturity risk has fallen to decadal lows...

PS: For those who insist on appealing blindly to this gauge as some sort of recession probability warning, without considering what message it is supposed to be sending about economic conditions at the turn of the cycle, this is still a *l-o-n-g* way from the danger zone.




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US High-yield spread over UST, log, divergence: Source - CSuisse



**In fact, everywhere we look, the rewards for accepting extra risk are falling.**


**With regard to credit quality, junk is now trading at the lowest spread since the Crisis and is thus heading back into the danger territory of the Asian Contagion/LTCM episode of the mid-90s and, beyond that, to the pre-LEH excesses of a decade ago**



...something equally evident if we look at the percentage premium on offer, not just at the arithmetical difference.

NB, the last three recessions have seen spreads blow out to the classic 'distressed' threshold of 1000bps over: today they stand at barely 400.

**Be warned!**




Meanwhile, the length of holding time needed to make up for an adverse yield change – approximated by the dividend of the modified duration and the YTM – has been pushed by central bank intervention to multi-sigma extremes, even *after* allowance is made for the rising secular bull market trend



## UST Log Price Risk

*Courtesy: Bloomberg*



Moreover, even with those for extreme levels of duration, implied volatility is so depressed that expected price changes are in the lowest decile, 2 standards off the last 28 years' well defined mean.



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


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
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Much the same dynamic applies to stocks as record absolute and percentage levels of short volatility positions have been built up this year




VXO log distribution: *Source - FRED*




**...and – guess what? – this has pushed implied vol out through the bottom of the past 30-years’ experience**

The percentage price of protection - OEX/VXO, absolute & detrended, 3mma: *Source - CBOE*




Scaling this by the stock level itself – to give us a rough, inverse measure of the percentage premium people are willing to pay for protection – we are again at new absolute and trend-adjusted highs of insouciance



**But, if there is no perceived risk, the only way to structure a portfolio is to add leverage, right?**


**Net margin debt on the NYSE is therefore hitting absolute and proportional records**

NYSE Net Margin/Market Cap v VXO: *Source - NYSE, CBOE*



Taking another perspective, by putting the last two graphs together, if we let net margin debt as a percentage of market cap stand in for a measure of leveraged sensitivity - and hence of the potential price changes under conditions of liquidation - it, too, registers an unprecedented multiple of the market's estimate of volatility

Finally, if we combine our measures of stock and bond risk into a single geometric average, we find ourselves once more falling off the bottom of the chart. UGH!





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